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The Effect of Institutional and Cultural
Factors on the Perceptions of Earnings
Management
Marshall Geiger and Joyce van der Laan Smith
ABSTRACT: In this study we examine the effect of stakeholder orientation versus
shareholder orientation, and the level of cultural secrecy on individuals’ perceptions of
earnings management practices. Examining perceptions from 1,260 participants from
13 countries indicates that individuals from stakeholder-oriented institutional backgrounds were less accepting of earnings management, including both accounting earnings management and operating earnings management activities, than participants
from shareholder-oriented institutional backgrounds, and that individuals from secretive
cultures were more accepting of both types of earnings management activities. Our
findings provide evidence of the anticipated perceptual differences across countries
with respect to earnings management and suggest the need for further research linking
perceptions to reported earnings management measures.

I. INTRODUCTION
constant pressure in accounting and business across the globe is for companies to report
stable, if not growing, financial position to stockholders, creditors, analysts, and other
interested parties. With this strain comes the pressure on the firm’s financial reporting
executives to “manage” the company’s reported financial results. In part, because of this financial
reporting pressure, we seem to be bombarded with news of financial wrongdoing in a continual
stream of announcements regarding someone, or some company, acting unethically in the context
of financial reporting, not only in the United States 共Hogan et al. 2008兲, but around the world
共Reinstein et al. 2006; Goh 2008; Olive 2008; Kahn 2009兲. While not all earnings management
leads to inappropriate financial reporting, it is important to examine these reporting practices from
diverse perspectives. Accordingly, the evaluation of perceptions regarding earnings management
behavior is a vital concern for business reporting worldwide. To the extent that perceptions lead to
the practice of earnings management, an examination of these perceptions is particularly germane
to the evaluation of the financial reporting climate in our growing international business community, and is of direct concern regarding the comparability of reported financial information across
countries. Accordingly, it is critically important to examine the perceptions of individuals from
different countries in an attempt to evaluate the climate for earnings management that may exist,
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and, therefore, the potential for biased financial information in different segments of our global
financial marketplace, even after the adoption of a common set of worldwide financial reporting
requirements 共Jeanjean and Stolowy 2008; Zeff 2007兲.
Thus, the purpose of this study is to further our understanding of perceptions regarding the
financial reporting practice of earnings management 共i.e., income smoothing or manipulating
income toward a desired goal兲 and to assess whether those perceptions may be influenced by
institutional and cultural factors across countries. Prior research has found evidence of systematic
cross-country variations in the perceptions of earnings management practices but has largely been
unable to attribute these differences to cultural factors 共Geiger et al. 2006兲. In addition, prior
research has examined the qualities of financial reporting for companies operating in countries
with either a stakeholder- or shareholder-oriented corporate governance model 共Ball et al. 2000;
Othman and Zeghal 2006兲, but has not examined individuals’ perceptions of earnings management
across this dimension. In this study, we combine and extend these areas of research by using a
previously developed instrument 共i.e., Merchant and Rockness 1994兲 to assess perceptions regarding the practice of earnings management of individuals from 13 countries. The studied countries
are characterized as having either a stakeholder-oriented corporate governance model or a
shareholder-oriented corporate governance model, and given that the objective of earnings management is to mask actual earnings, we examine countries that are different on the cultural
dimension of secrecy 共Hope et al. 2008兲.
We test our hypotheses by comparing the perceptions of 730 participants from seven countries
having a shareholder-oriented corporate governance model 共i.e., Australia, Hong Kong, Ireland,
Malaysia, Singapore, U.K., and the United States兲 to the perceptions of 530 participants from six
countries that have a stakeholder-oriented corporate governance model 共i.e., Argentina, Belgium,
Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, and Spain兲. In addition, the level of cultural secrecy for the 13 countries
included in the study varies considerably and provides acceptable variation in order to examine
this cultural dimension.
Our findings suggest that participants from all countries generally viewed accounting earnings
management actions 共i.e., changing reserve estimates, etc.兲 as less acceptable than operating earnings management actions 共i.e., changing operating policies兲, and that participants from
stakeholder-oriented countries were less tolerant of earnings management activities than participants from shareholder-oriented countries. We also find individuals from highly secretive cultures
are more accepting of earnings management. Our perceptual findings provide evidence that differences in perceptions of earnings management across countries are significantly associated with
the country’s stakeholder/shareholder orientation and the level of cultural secrecy. Our findings
also suggest the need for further research regarding the link between the perceptions of earnings
management and the level and measurement of earnings management activities that may exist
across countries, as well as the institutional and market factors that may account for these disparities 共Ball et al. 2000; Othman and Zeghal 2006; Jeanjean and Stolowy 2008兲. Overall, our findings
contribute to the ongoing cross-country debate regarding the complex relationship between institutions, culture, and financial reporting 共Hope 2003; Zeff 2007兲.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In the next section we provide a brief background,
review the salient literature, and develop the hypotheses. We then discuss our methodology and
provide a description of our sample and data in Section III. We present the results of the analyses
in Section IV and offer conclusions from our study in the final section.
II. BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Earnings Management
Manipulating reported earnings, both internally and for external reporting purposes, is a very
real temptation faced by all accountants and financial professionals 共Guenther 1994; Healy and
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Wahlen 1999; Matsumoto 2002; Moehrle 2002; Kinnunen and Koskela 2003; Tsakumis 2007;
Francis and Wang 2008兲. Manipulating, or “managing,” one’s earnings takes a variety of forms
and includes the practice of selectively choosing accounting estimates or timing operating or
investment decisions to move reported earnings either upwards or downwards toward a desired
goal 共Schipper 1989; Merchant and Rockness 1994; Healy and Wahlen 1999兲. Prior research
reveals considerable disagreement regarding the general ethical acceptability of the practice of
managing earnings 共Bruns and Merchant 1990; Merchant and Rockness 1994; Fischer and Rosenzweig 1995兲. While some individuals view these decisions as part of the typical set of financial
reporting decisions and responsibilities, others view them as attempts to intentionally mislead the
financial community 共Mintz 1997; Xu et al. 2007兲.
Whether to engage in the practice of earnings management is one of the most important
ethical and financial reporting issues accountants face in everyday practice around the world
共Armstrong 1993; Kinnunen and Koskela 2003; Siregar and Utama 2008兲. Investors and creditors
in every nation depend on accountants to provide fair and reliable financial information regardless
of national orientation or institutional background. Financial statement users must be certain that
companies report accurate information on which financial decisions must be based 共Zeff 2007兲.
Companies and individuals that engage in earnings management may misrepresent the true longrun economic profitability, and sustainability of their operations.
Although professional standards in all countries require accountants to present unbiased information 共Zeff 2007兲, there are many facets to the earnings management issue, as well as potential ways to “manage” a company’s reported accounting earnings 共Schipper 1989; Armstrong
1993; Xu et al. 2007兲. A large body of anecdotal and empirical evidence on publicly disclosed
financial information suggests that individuals or companies practice earnings management 共Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Healy and Wahlen 1999; Brown 2001; Kinnunen and Koskela 2003兲. For
example, Cahan 共1992兲 found that companies use discretionary accruals to reduce their reported
earnings during antitrust investigations. DeFond and Jiambalvo 共1994兲 concluded that financially
troubled companies appear to use accruals to increase their earnings to avoid violating debt
covenants. Perry and Williams 共1994兲 found evidence of income-reducing accruals just prior to
management buyout offers, while Erickson and Wang 共1999兲 found evidence of income-increasing
accruals just prior to stock-for-stock mergers. Kinnunen and Koskela 共2003兲 document the practice
of upward rounding of net income disclosures across 18 countries, as managers attempt to present
a more favorable economic picture of the company.
While these studies of publicly reported financial information suggest the practice of earnings
management exists in many settings cross-nationally, there has been little research with respect to
the perceptions of this practice and its acceptability. Consistent with this, Han et al. 共2010兲 note
that more recent research in accounting and finance has started to come to grips with the influence
of the “softer dimension” of human values and their impact on cross-national capital markets.
Continuing in this line of research, we examine the cross-national perceptions of earnings management and follow Merchant and Rockness 共1994兲, who argue that there are generally two ways
to engage in earnings management—accounting earnings management 共AEM兲 and operating earnings management 共OEM兲. AEM activities include the intentional manipulation of accounting
numbers and include practices such as intentionally recording transactions in the wrong period,
recording fictitious transactions, or artificially increasing/decreasing account balances or reserves
to attain desired reporting goals 共e.g., backdating sales invoices, or intentionally over- or understating inventory or the allowance for uncollectibles兲. In contrast, OEM activities pertain to the
modification of operating policies and activities in order to attain the desired reporting results.
OEM activities involve the timing or structuring of underlying business transactions. Xu et al.
共2007兲 argue that these are the “real” earnings management practices, as they often include activities that may be inefficient or detrimental from the firm’s long-term perspective, such as not
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performing regularly scheduled maintenance or increasing/decreasing current discretionary spending, but are performed in order to attain desired current reporting goals. While not misrepresenting
the activities of the organization, these actions are undertaken with the intent of obtaining specific
reporting goals that would not have otherwise been achieved in the normal course of operations
共Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005; Xu et al. 2007兲.
Given the differences in the methods of accomplishing AEM and OEM, we expect that there
will be differences in the perception of the type of manipulations for our study. Prior single
country studies 共Merchant and Rockness 1994兲 and cross-country studies 共Geiger et al. 2006兲 have
found that AEM is considered significantly less acceptable than OEM. Accordingly, we expect the
same to hold true for our study across all countries, irrespective of institutional or cultural factors.
Thus, in order to establish the equivalence of our sample with those of prior research, we first
hypothesize that there will be differences in overall perceptions regarding OEM and AEM activities for all individuals regardless of country. Thus, our first hypothesis is:
H1: Participants from all countries will perceive AEM activities as significantly less acceptable than OEM activities.
Shareholder versus Stakeholder Orientation
An institutional factor that has been examined as an explanatory factor for cross-national
differences in reported earnings management is the type of corporate governance model that is
most prevalent in the reporting country. In this context, countries have been identified as either
having a stakeholder or a shareholder orientation 共Ball et al. 2000; Othman and Zeghal 2006兲. This
distinction arises from the stakeholder theory literature that argues that successful firms are those
which effectively manage their many stakeholder relationships 共Freeman et al. 2007兲. Following
the theory of stakeholder salience, the relationships a firm chooses to manage are based on the
stakeholder attributes of power, legitimacy, and urgency 共Mitchell et al. 1997兲. van der Laan Smith
et al. 共2005兲 argue that these stakeholder attributes are also affected by the institutional environment, which varies cross-nationally.
In comparison to shareholder-oriented countries, stakeholder-oriented countries are those with
more of a communitarian perspective, which “holds that a corporation is a social organization that
has social responsibilities that go beyond achieving economic efficiency” 共van der Laan Smith et
al. 2005, 130兲. Given this broader perspective, all stakeholders, and not only the company’s
shareholders, are viewed as having a legitimate voice in corporate activities. Further, Ball et al.
共2000兲 argue that in the stakeholder governance model, accounting income is viewed as a common
“pie” divided up among stakeholders, such as dividends to shareholders, taxes to governments,
bonuses to managers, and, possibly, pay increases to employees. This portfolio of interested
stakeholders is all considered to share in success or failure of the company and are all impacted by
financial reporting 共Freeman et al. 2007兲.
In contrast, shareholder-oriented countries hold a contractarian perspective and view shareholder wealth maximization as the primary purpose of the corporation, resulting in less legitimacy
accorded other stakeholder groups. In these shareholder-oriented countries, the needs and views of
the corporate shareholders clearly dominate those of all other affected groups 共Mitchell et al.
1997兲. Ball et al. 共2000兲 and Leuz et al. 共2003兲 argue that stakeholder-oriented countries are also
typically code-law countries, and shareholder-oriented countries are typically common-law countries. They note that accounting information needs are different between these two types of countries with code-law countries maintaining relatively higher degrees of insiders who already have
access to information, and being subject to comparatively stronger degrees of political influence
from governments in the establishment of accounting regulations. For example, Ball et al. 共2000兲
note that in a code-law country like Germany, the government sets both the accounting and tax
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regulations, resulting in German financial reporting being almost identical to tax reporting. In
addition, they argue that code-law and common-law countries have different institutional factors
that bear on financial reporting outcomes, with common-law 共shareholder-oriented兲 countries’
financial reporting being more influenced by the need for public disclosure of information to the
shareholders in the market, and code-law 共stakeholder-oriented兲 countries being more influenced
by the payout preferences of already reasonably well-informed stakeholders. In addition, because
of the relatively higher need to inform shareholders, Ball et al. 共2000兲 argue that shareholderoriented countries are also ones with stronger financial market institutions and enforcements in
place in order to aid in the dissemination of information to the company’s owners.
Using this stakeholder/shareholder dichotomy, Ball et al. 共2000兲 find that accounting income
more quickly incorporates economic losses in common-law countries compared to code-law countries, which they argue proxies for the level of reported earnings management. Thus, they conclude
that common-law 共shareholder-oriented兲 countries exhibit lower levels of reported earnings management than code-law 共stakeholder-oriented兲 countries. In addition, Leuz et al. 共2003兲 find that
“outsider economies with relatively dispersed ownership, strong investor protection, and large
stock markets,” as is primarily found in shareholder-oriented countries, exhibit less earnings
management in their public financial reporting than “insider countries with relatively concentrated
ownership, weak investor protection, and less developed stock markets,” as is predominately
found in stakeholder-oriented countries. Othman and Zeghal 共2006兲 examine reporting in France
共a stakeholder-oriented country兲 and Canada 共a shareholder-oriented country兲 and find that earnings management activities are linked to specific and different incentives between the two countries. They find that earnings management activity is linked to contractual debt costs and effective
tax rates in French firms, but is linked to issuing equity in Canadian firms.
As noted by these earlier researchers, companies operating in common-law countries generally have higher levels of regulation, and litigation, and the need for more transparent financial
information compared to code-law countries. These differences result in different financial market
forces and information needs by financial market participants. Accordingly, we cannot be certain
whether their findings of differences in reported financial information are due to individuals’
perceptions of the acceptability of earnings management practices, or the additional institutional
and market forces impacting corporate financial reporting in these two different settings.
Based on the foundations of stakeholder theory 共Freeman et al. 2007兲, however, we expect
that individuals from stakeholder countries would perceive the practice of earnings management as
more serious, and be less accepting of it due to the fact that, from this perspective, it affects many
different interested stakeholder groups. Thus, notwithstanding some of the empirical findings of
earlier researchers on financial reporting issues, we believe that the perceptions of the overall
acceptability of earnings management will be lower 共i.e., less accepting兲 for individuals from
stakeholder-oriented countries than for individuals from shareholder-oriented countries. Accordingly, our second hypothesis:
H2: Participants from stakeholder-oriented countries will perceive earnings management to
be less acceptable than participants from shareholder-oriented countries.
Cultural Secrecy
Othman and Zeghal 共2006兲 note that, as with all human activities, accounting rules and
practices, as well as the capital markets, are affected by culture. Accounting is a socio-technical
activity involving an interaction between both human and non-human factions and, because the
two interact, accounting cannot be culture-free. And as further asserted by Han et al. 共2010兲 and
Hussein 共1996兲, there is an increasing awareness among many accounting researchers and standard setters of the social and cultural influences on accounting 共Gray 1988; Beresford 1990兲.
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In fact, culture has been found to influence the development of accounting systems 共Gray
1988; Doupnik and Salter 1995; Nobes 1983兲, the perceptions of the participants in those systems
共Doupnik and Tsakumis 2004兲, and the application of financial reporting rules within the accounting systems 共Tsakumis 2007兲. With respect to earnings management, Braun and Rodriguez 共2008兲
find a positive relationship between Gray’s 共1988兲 culturally derived accounting values of statutory control, uniformity, conservatism, secrecy, and earnings management. Further, Kinnunen and
Koskela 共2003兲 identify a positive relationship between earnings management and Hofstede’s
共1991, 2001兲 cultural value of power distance, which measures the extent to which individuals
accept human authority inequality. Similarly, Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai 共2007兲 conclude that
Hofstede’s cultural values of uncertainty avoidance and masculinity were related to earnings
management.
In the context of our study, since the objective of earnings management, whether AEM or
OEM, is to conceal “unmanaged” results and to drive reported earnings toward a desired goal, we
examine the cultural dimension of secrecy, developed by Hope et al. 共2008兲. In their derivation of
the cultural dimension of secrecy, Hope et al. 共2008兲 incorporate a majority of Hofstede’s 共2001兲
five cultural dimensions to arrive at a country’s secrecy score.1 Hope et al. 共2008兲 extend the
earlier cultural work of Gray 共1988兲 and Hofstede 共1980, 1991, 2001兲, and argue that a composite
measure of cultural secrecy is related to cross-cultural differences in financial reporting. Companies from countries that have more secretive cultures would tend to try and conceal or not fully
disclose relevant financial information and be less financially transparent than companies from less
secretive cultures. Accordingly, Hope et al. 共2008兲 find, consistent with their secrecy expectations,
that companies in more secretive cultures are less likely to engage a higher-quality Big 4 audit
firm 共who would be more likely to require full financial disclosures兲 than companies in less
secretive cultures.
Based on these earlier works, we adopt the approach espoused in Hope et al. 共2008兲 and
examine the association of cultural secrecy with individual’s perceptions of earnings management.
We hypothesize that individuals from cultures that are more secretive will also be more tolerant of
both types of earnings management compared to individuals from less secretive countries. Thus,
our final hypothesis is:
H3: Participants from more secretive countries will perceive earnings management as more
acceptable than participants from less secretive countries.
III. METHOD
Earnings Management Questionnaire
In order to capture perceptions of earnings management, participants answered a questionnaire that asked them to evaluate the ethical acceptability of 13 earnings management activities.
The scenarios were originally developed by Bruns and Merchant 共1990兲 and subsequently used by
Merchant and Rockness 共1994兲, Fischer and Rosenzweig 共1995兲, and Geiger et al. 共2006兲 to study
perceptions regarding the practice of earnings management. The scenarios address relatively
straightforward practices such as delaying or accelerating discretionary expenses or intentionally
manipulating inventory reserves. A copy of the questionnaire items is included in the Appendix.
As noted previously, earnings can be manipulated either by altering or misrepresenting the
recording of existing transactions and events—an accounting earnings management manipulation,
or by manipulating business activities near year-end to move revenues and expenses into desired

1

Hofstede’s 共2001兲 five cultural dimensions are Individualism/Collectivism, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance,
Masculinity/Femininity, and Long-Term Orientation.
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periods—an operating earnings management manipulation. Merchant and Rockness 共1994兲 categorized the 13 scenarios according to whether they were AEM or OEM manipulations.2 For
example, scenario number 6, in which the manager misrepresents the division’s inventory reserve,
is an example of an AEM. Scenario number 2, in which a manager orders employees to defer
discretionary expenditures until the next accounting period, is an example of an OEM.
In addition, the scenarios presented to the subjects were GAAP/IFRS context-free. Meaning,
the scenarios were typical business activities and were not specifically addressed in either U.S.
GAAP or international IFRS financial reporting standards. Further, we did not specify that the
respondent apply any national or international financial reporting rules when completing the instrument. We simply asked them how ethical they believed the actions were. Accordingly, we have
attempted to assess whether perceptions regarding the acceptability of earnings management techniques, in general, and with respect to AEM and OEM manipulations, are influenced by national
culture and institutional factors, not whether the actions in the scenarios are necessarily prohibited
or allowed under U.S. GAAP or IFRS.
As in Merchant and Rockness 共1994兲, our subjects responded to each scenario using a fivepoint scale, ranging from a 1 for “Ethical practice.” to a 5 for “Totally unethical. The manager
should be fired.” Thus, higher scores indicate that individuals perceived the action proposed in the
scenario as less ethical than action perceptions represented by lower scores. Accordingly, high
scores indicate how unacceptable the subject believed the action in question to be.
Country Selection
Stakeholder/Shareholder-Orientation Countries
The countries selected were chosen to enhance the distinction in the shareholder/stakeholderoriented corporate governance structure, and to represent varying degrees of the cultural attribute
of secrecy. Consistent with Ball et al. 共2000兲, we use the classification of a country’s legal system
as a proxy for corporate governance structure, and we select countries from the common-law
tradition and the French code-law tradition. La Porta et al. 共1998, 1132, 1134兲 found that “shareholders in the two most widely spread legal regimes—common law and French civil law—operate
in very different legal environments” and that “common-law countries have the relatively strongest and the French civil-law countries the weakest, protections of shareholders.” Given this
finding, we believe that the French code-law countries would be most likely to exhibit the least
shareholder orientation and, therefore, the strongest stakeholder orientation and, accordingly, provide the greatest contrast to shareholder-oriented countries. We selected the common-law countries
of Australia, Hong Kong, Ireland, Malaysia, Singapore, the U.K., and the United States to represent shareholder-oriented countries. We include Argentina, Belgium, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, and
Spain to represent stakeholder-oriented countries.
Secrecy Scores
Following Hope et al. 共2008兲, we use their measure of cultural Secrecy, which combines
Hofstede’s 共2001兲 uncertainty avoidance 共UA兲, power distance 共POW兲, and individualism 共IND兲
dimensions into one composite secrecy score. Consistent with Gray 共1988兲, Hope et al. 共2008兲
argue that high uncertainty avoidance countries tend to restrict information disclosures to avoid
conflict and preserve security, and high power distance countries tend to restrict information
disclosures to preserve power inequalities, leading to higher secrecy. Further, higher preferences

2

The questionnaire also includes scenarios that vary the direction 共income increasing versus decreasing兲, and dollar
amount 共materiality兲 of the manipulation, as well as the intentions of the manager committing the manipulation.
However, since the focus of our study is on national institutional and cultural differences, we focus our analyses on the
overall types of manipulations and separately assess only the AEM and OEM measures.
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for collectivism, as opposed to individualism, are also consistent with Gray’s 共1988兲 framework
for reporting secrecy. Accordingly, a country’s composite Secrecy score is calculated as their
power distance 共POW兲 score plus their uncertainty avoidance 共UA兲 score minus their individualism 共IND兲 score.
Participants
The participants in this study were 1,383 upper-level accounting students at several public and
private universities in the 13 countries.3 Participation was voluntary and the responses to the
questionnaire were anonymous. In order to ensure that the students understood the nature of the
accounting scenarios, participation was limited to upper-level students who previously had at least
one financial reporting course, and data was collected toward the end of the semester in all
courses.4 When collecting demographic data, participants were also asked to indicate their home
country. We used these responses and not the country location of participation to identify individual’s country of nationality.5 Thirty-five students either did not provide all demographic data or
did not answer all the questions, and 88 participants were eliminated because there were not at
least 20 respondents from their country of origin. These data requirements resulted in 1,260 usable
responses across the 13 countries.6
The use of students as surrogates for employed adults has long been an issue in business
research 共Dickhaut et al. 1972兲. However, several studies have suggested that the use of business
students to proxy for professionals is appropriate when assessing basic traits or perceptions, but
not for higher-order decision-making skills 共Campbell 1986; Ward 1993兲. For example, Remus
共1986兲 and Greenberg 共1987兲 specifically addressed this student surrogate issue by studying both
business students and employed adults simultaneously. Both these studies conclude that there were
no differences between the business students and the employed adults. Therefore, Remus 共1986兲
argues that the use of mature business students as surrogates for employed professionals is appropriate. Our study examines the perceptions of more mature, upper-level students—thus, meeting
Remus’ criteria.
In addition, numerous prior researchers have utilized accounting and business students in the
assessment of ethical issues 共Stanga and Turpen 1991; Morris and McDonald 1995; Snodgrass and
Behling 1996; Roxas and Stoneback 1997兲. We also assess perceptions regarding fairly simple
earnings management techniques, and assess differences across national, institutional, and cultural
factors.
Model
In order to properly examine whether our variables of interest 共Stakeholder and Secrecy兲 are
significantly associated with individuals’ perceptions of earnings management practices, we include several controls in our regression analyses that have been found in prior research to be
associated with earnings management or differences in financial reporting across countries. Spe-

3
4
5

6

The instrument was translated into Spanish for administration in Mexico and Spain. All other courses were taught in
English.
In our context, upper-level students refer to students that have completed at least one financial reporting course prior to
their participation in the study, with most of the students in their last year of university study.
Students studying in countries other than their home country were most prevalent in Australian universities. In order to
determine that location of data collection was not a factor 共i.e., data collected when in their “home” country or whether
they were “studying abroad”兲, we performed separate t-tests on all the variables of interest to the study and found no
significant differences due to location of the participant. Thus, all country participants have been combined for analysis.
Where multiple sites in the same country were used to collect data 共e.g., in Australia and the United States兲, an
examination of differences between sites on all the variables of interest to the study were performed. These analyses
indicate no significant differences due to location of the participant within the country. Thus, all country locations have
been combined for analysis.
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cifically, we control for a country’s ownership concentration 共Own兲 following Leuz 共2006兲 who
found that ownership concentration was associated with the level of earnings management. We
control for the national level of shareholders rights 共Rights兲 following Fonseca and Gonzalez
共2008兲, Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai 共2007兲, and Leuz et al. 共2003兲 who all found evidence of less
earnings management in countries with strong investor protection. We control for the strength of
the country’s legal enforcement system 共Enforce兲 following Leuz et al. 共2003兲 who observed a
negative relationship between legal enforcement and earnings management. We add a control for
the country’s level of per capita gross national income 共GNI兲 since La Porta et al. 共1998兲 found
that a country’s ability to enforce their system of law was influenced by their national wealth. In
addition, we also control for the participants age 共Age兲 and whether they were an accounting major
共Major兲 or not, which might also affect their overall perceptions of earnings management 共Merchant and Rockness 1994兲. In general, we would expect accounting majors to be less accepting of
earnings management activities.
Accordingly, we estimate the following regression model:
AEM,OEM,TEM,TYPE = ␤0 + ␤1Stakeholder + ␤2Secrecy + ␤3Own + ␤4Enforce + ␤5Rights
+ ␤6Log共GNI兲 + ␤7Age + ␤8Major + 

共1兲

where:
AEM ⫽ average score on the accounting earnings management items;
OEM ⫽ average score on the operating earnings management items;
TEM ⫽ average score on all earnings management items;
TYPE ⫽ difference between AEM and OEM 共i.e., AEM⫺OEM兲;
Stakeholder ⫽ coded a 1 if from a stakeholder-oriented country, 0 otherwise;
Secrecy ⫽ cultural secrecy score 共UA ⫹ POW⫺IND兲;
Own ⫽ ownership concentration, which is the mean ownership by the three largest
shareholders of the ten largest nonfinancial domestic firms from La Porta et al.
共1998兲;
Enforce ⫽ calculation following Leuz et al. 共2003兲 as the mean score across three legal
enforcement variables 共efficiency of the judicial system, assessment of the
rule of law, and the corruption index兲 from La Porta et al. 共1998兲. All three
component variables range from 0 to 10;
Rights ⫽ shareholder rights, the anti-director rights index from La Porta et al. 共1998兲, and
ranges from 0 to 5;
Log 共GNI兲 ⫽ log of the average GNI per capita for 2004–2006 for all countries, except the
United States, which is the average for 1999–2001, from the World Development
Indicators database, World Bank;7
Age ⫽ age of the individual;
Major ⫽ 0 if an accounting major, 1 otherwise; and
 ⫽ an error term.

7

GNI is measured as the per capita average gross national income over the three years before and during the sample
period, 2004–2006 for all countries except the United States. The U.S. sample was collected in 2001, so we use the
1999–2001 average for that sample.
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IV. RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 indicates the number of participants from each country included in the study, as well
as the mean age of participants; the country’s Secrecy score, as well as the three cultural index
scores from Hofstede 共2001兲 that comprise the Secrecy score; and the country’s stakeholder or
shareholder orientation based on the classification as a French code-law or common-law country,
respectively, from La Porta et al. 共1998兲. As indicated in Table 1, the largest number of participants

TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics for Sample
Shareholder
Countries

Sample
Size

Cultural Dimension Factors

Mean
Age

IND

POW

UA

Secrecy

Institutional Factors
Own Rights Enforce

GNI

Australia
Hong Kong
Ireland
Malaysia
Singapore
U.K.
United States

104
43
114
22
20
52
375

23.6
22.7
19.5
20.9
22.7
21.6
22.3

90
25
70
26
20
89
91

36
68
28
104
74
35
40

51
29
35
36
8
35
46

⫺3
72
⫺7
114
62
⫺19
⫺5

.28
.54
.39
.54
.49
.19
.20

4
5
4
4
4
5
5

9.51
8.91
8.36
7.72
8.93
9.22
9.54

$34,417
$25,507
$41,564
$5,206
$25,930
$38,345
$34,424

Total

730

22.0

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Stakeholder
Countries
Argentina
Belgium
Indonesia
Italy
Mexico
Spain
Total
Overall

Sample
Size
42
71
30
54
207
126

Cultural Dimension Factors

Mean
Age

IND

POW

UA

Secrecy

NR
20.8
21.0
22.6
22.0
19.1

46
75
14
76
30
51

49
65
78
50
81
57

86
94
48
75
82
86

89
84
112
49
133
92

Institutional Factors
Own Rights Enforce
.53
.54
.58
.58
.64
.51

4
0
2
1
1
4

5.79
9.44
2.87
7.07
5.37
7.14

GNI
$4,556
$36,631
$1,275
$30,268
$7,200
$25,769

530

19.4

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

1,260

20.9

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Variable Definitions:
NR ⫽ not reported;
IND ⫽ individualism index score from Hofstede 共2001兲;
POW ⫽ power distance index from Hofstede 共2001兲;
UA ⫽ uncertainty avoidance index from Hofstede 共2001兲;
Secrecy ⫽ secrecy dimension calculated following Hope et al. 共2008兲 from the Hofstede cultural scores as UA ⫹
POW ⫺ IND;
Own ⫽ ownership concentration, which is the mean ownership by the three largest shareholders of the 10
largest nonfinancial domestic firms from La Porta et al. 共1998兲;
Rights ⫽ shareholder rights is the anti-director rights index from La Porta et al. 共1998兲 and ranges from 0 to 5;
Enforce ⫽ calculation following Leuz et al. 共2003兲 as the mean score across three legal enforcement variables
共efficiency of the judicial system, assessment of the rule of law, and the corruption index兲 from La
Porta et al. 共1998兲. All three component variables range from 0 to 10; and
GNI ⫽ average GNI per capita for 2004–2006 for all countries, except the United States, which is the
average for 1999–2001, from the World Development Indicators database, World Bank.
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was from the United States, 375, followed by Mexico with 207 participants. Overall, we had 730
participants from shareholder-oriented countries and 530 participants from stakeholder-oriented
countries for a total of 1,260 participants in the study. The participants ranged in age from 18 to
46 years with an overall median age of 20.9 years for all participants—reinforcing that we have
included relatively mature participants in our study. This average age of the students is also
reflective of our attempt to utilize upper-level students that would most likely be familiar with the
accounting and business issues presented in the instrument, and also likely to fully reflect the
national cultures and institutional orientations to which they belong. Further, the mean age of
participants in shareholder countries was 22.0 years and was 19.4 years in stakeholder countries.
An independent samples t-test of the mean ages revealed a significant difference between the
shareholder and stakeholder groups 共p ⬍ .000兲. Accordingly, when performing our analyses of
differences between groups, as noted previously, we control for age of the participant in each of
our models.
Table 1 also indicates a fairly wide dispersion of cultural index scores, and Secrecy scores in
particular, across the 13 countries included in the study. Specifically, we find that Secrecy scores
range from ⫺19 to 133 in total, and from ⫺19 to 114 for the shareholder-oriented countries and
from 49 to 133 for the stakeholder-oriented countries. This dispersion of cultural secrecy scores
allows us to perform a robust examination of this cultural factor on perceptions of earnings
management across our study participants from the 13 countries.
Table 2 presents the mean responses to the 13 scenarios as well as the means for the total
instrument 共TEM兲, as well as means for AEM and OEM questionnaire items, the mean difference
between the AEM and OEM items across participants 共TYPE兲, by country and institutional
orientation.8 As expected, the mean responses were higher in the stakeholder-oriented countries as
compared to the shareholder-oriented countries for both AEM 共3.02 versus 2.96兲 and OEM 共2.34
versus 2.15兲 items 共p ⬍ 0.10 and 0.01, respectively兲, indicating that each type of practice was
considered less acceptable in the stakeholder-oriented countries. In addition, the average overall
mean response 共TEM兲 for the shareholder countries of 2.58 was also significantly lower than that
of the stakeholder countries of 2.71 共p ⬍ 0.01兲. The last column of Table 2 indicates the significant
results of individual ANCOVAs conducted comparing shareholder countries to stakeholder countries for each question and the mean responses to the entire instrument 共TEM兲, AEM, and OEM
questions, as well as the differences between AEM and OEM questions 共TYPE). Age 共Age兲 and
accounting major 共Major兲 were treated as covariates in each of the analyses. Based on these
analyses we identified significant 共p ⬍ .05 or stronger兲 differences between shareholder- and
stakeholder-oriented countries for questions 1, 3, 4a, 4b, 4c, and 5a. We also identified a significant difference between the two groups in the mean responses to the OEM questions 共p ⬍ 0.01兲
and the AEM questions 共p ⬍ 0.10兲, and for the TEM 共p ⬍ 0.01兲 and TYPE 共p ⬍ 0.05兲 analyses. As
expected from stakeholder theory, these univariate comparisons indicate that participants from the
stakeholder-oriented countries found both AEM and OEM to be less acceptable than the participants from shareholder-oriented countries.
Hypotheses Tests
Hypothesis 1 states that participants from all countries will perceive AEM as significantly less
acceptable than OEM activities. We tested this hypothesis using a paired samples t-test of the

8

We calculated Cronbach’s alpha for AEM and OEM items for shareholder countries 共0.769 and 0.656, respectively兲 and
stakeholder countries 共0.735 and 0.594, respectively兲 indicating adequate internal consistency by country group.
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TABLE 2
Earnings Management by Country and Institutional Orientationa
Shareholder-Oriented Countries

Scenario

Volume 9, No. 2, 2010

Situation Factors
AEM 共3 ⫹ 5a ⫹ 5b ⫹ 6a ⫹
6b ⫹ 7a ⫹ 7b兲/7
OEM 共1 ⫹ 2a ⫹ 2b ⫹ 4a ⫹
4b ⫹ 4c兲/6
TYPE 共AEM ⫺ OEM兲

Hong Kong
(n ⴝ 43)

Ireland
(n ⴝ 114)

Malaysia
(n ⴝ 22)

Singapore
(n ⴝ 20)

U.K.
(n ⴝ 52)

United
States
(n ⴝ 375)

Overall
Total
(n ⴝ 730)

1.29
2.67

1.44
2.53

1.23
2.70

1.64
2.95

1.20
3.05

1.17
2.73

1.14
2.86

1.21
2.79

3.02
3.07
1.88
1.79
1.81
2.71

3.05
2.84
2.12
1.88
2.12
2.93

3.23
3.26
2.07
1.71
1.99
2.54

3.27
3.14
2.00
1.86
1.75
2.77

3.50
3.15
2.65
1.75
2.20
3.25

3.13
2.85
1.88
1.96
1.56
2.42

3.47
3.22
2.04
1.73
1.69
2.65

3.31
3.15
2.03
1.77
1.79
2.66

2.96

2.98

2.93

2.81

3.25

3.18

3.20

3.10

2.59

2.35

2.02

2.50

2.45

2.29

2.65

2.49

2.79

2.32

2.53

2.50

2.70

2.79

3.22

2.93

2.48

2.84

2.67

2.68

2.65

2.56

2.84

2.73

3.41

3.44

3.47

3.41

3.80

3.38

3.82

3.64

2.49

2.53

2.49

2.58

2.74

2.45

2.66

2.58

2.85

2.81

2.77

2.83

3.04

2.78

3.08

2.96

2.07

2.19

2.16

2.28

2.39

2.07

2.15

2.15

.7816†††

.6240†††

.6295†††

.5509†††

.6440†††

.7079†††

.9317†††

.8082†††

(continued on next page)
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1. Paint building early
2a. Defer expenditures for
quarter
2b. Defer expenditures for year
3. Record supplies next year
4a. End-of-year sales program
4b. Overtime in December
4c. Sell unused assets
5a. Prepay $60 K travel
expenses
5b. Write down $700 K
inventory
6a. Write up inventory-product
development
6b. Write up inventory-meet
budget
7a. Delay recording $30 K
invoice
7b. Delay recording $500 K
invoice
Total 共TEM兲

Australia
(n ⴝ 104)

Stakeholder-Oriented Countries
Indonesia
(n ⴝ 30)

Italy
(n ⴝ 54)

Mexico
(n ⴝ 207)

Spain
(n ⴝ 126)

1.40
2.62

1.25
2.61

1.63
2.83

2.15
3.11

1.60
2.58

1.48
2.81

1.57***
2.71

3.12
2.69
1.69
1.98
2.02
2.50

3.59
3.18
2.00
1.49
2.01
3.10

3.17
3.30
2.97
2.13
2.10
2.90

3.79
3.57
2.42
2.42
2.56
3.59

3.00
3.20
2.17
2.17
1.97
2.72

3.37
3.47
2.14
2.27
2.62
2.77

3.27
3.26**
2.17***
2.11***
2.20***
2.86***

3.00

3.56

2.57

3.44

2.94

3.26

3.13

2.43

2.56

2.27

2.54

2.30

2.83

2.50

2.95

3.22

2.67

3.41

2.39

3.12

2.84

3.12

2.79

2.77

3.00

2.63

2.96

2.81

4.09

3.97

3.80

4.07

3.40

3.90

3.74

2.59

2.72

2.70

3.08

2.54

2.85

2.71***

2.97

3.20

2.90

3.37

2.80

3.19

3.02*

2.14

2.16

2.47

2.74

2.25

2.45

2.34***

.8305†††

1.0396†††

.4230†††

.6318†††

.5491†††

.7374†††

.6832†††**

*, **, *** Indicate significant differences between shareholder and stakeholder means at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively 共two-tailed兲.
†††
a

Indicates significant differences between AEM and OEM means at the 0.01 level 共two-tailed兲.
This table presents the mean responses to the questions on earnings management scenarios measured using a five-point Likert scale anchored with 1 ⫽ “Ethical practice.” and 5
⫽ “Totally unethical. The manager should be fired.” The last column reports p-values from the ANCOVA test of the differences in the means between shareholder and stakeholder
countries. Age and whether the participant was an accounting major were treated as covariates in the analysis.
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Situation Factors
AEM 共3 ⫹ 5a ⫹ 5b ⫹ 6a ⫹
6b ⫹ 7a ⫹ 7b兲/7
OEM 共1 ⫹ 2a ⫹ 2b ⫹ 4a ⫹
4b ⫹ 4c兲/6
TYPE 共AEM ⫺ OEM兲

Belgium
(n ⴝ 71)

The Effect of Institutional and Cultural Factors on the Perceptions of Earnings Management

Journal of International Accounting Research

Scenario
1. Paint building early
2a. Defer expenditures for
quarter
2b. Defer expenditures for year
3. Record supplies next year
4a. End-of-year sales program
4b. Overtime in December
4c. Sell unused assets
5a. Prepay $60 K travel
expenses
5b. Write down $700 K
inventory
6a. Write up inventory-product
development
6b. Write up inventory-meet
budget
7a. Delay recording $30 K
invoice
7b. Delay recording $500 K
invoice
Total 共TEM兲

Overall
Total
(n ⴝ 530)

Argentina
(n ⴝ 42)

34
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Variable Definitions:
TEM ⫽ total earnings management;
AEM ⫽ accounting earnings management manipulations;
OEM ⫽ operating earnings management manipulations; and
TYPE ⫽ AEM ⫺ OEM.
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mean responses to the AEM and OEM scenarios separately for each of the countries. Consistent
with the findings of Merchant and Rockness 共1994兲 and Geiger et al. 共2006兲 we find that AEM was
considered significantly 共p ⬍ 0.01兲 less acceptable than OEM in each of the 13 countries, as well
as in the combined shareholder-oriented countries 共t ⫽ 31.140, df ⫽ 729兲 and the combined
stakeholder-oriented countries 共t ⫽ 22.669, df ⫽ 529兲, and for the overall sample 共t ⫽ 38.286, df
⫽ 1,259兲.
We also examine whether TYPE, the difference between OEM and AEM, is significantly
different from zero, separately, for each of the countries. Results of these analyses indicate that
TYPE was significantly different from zero 共p ⬍ 0.01兲 for individuals in each of the 13 counties
examined. These findings, along with the earlier analyses, provide consistent support for H1 and
indicate that the participants reacted similarly to participants in prior research who also perceived
AEM as significantly less acceptable than OEM activities 共Merchant and Rockness 1994; Geiger
et al. 2006兲, which also serves to reinforce the representativeness of our study participants with
those of prior research.
Hypotheses 2 states that there will be a significant difference in the perception of earnings
management between shareholder- and stakeholder-oriented countries with participants from
stakeholder countries considering both AEM and OEM, as well as TEM, as less acceptable than
participants from shareholder countries. To formally test this hypothesis, we use model 1 and
ordinary least-squares regressions to examine the mean responses to AEM, OEM, TYPE, and TEM
across differences in stakeholder-oriented countries. Further, H3 predicts that participants from
more secretive countries will be more accepting of earnings management than participants from
less secretive countries. To test this hypothesis we also include the Secrecy variable into our
regression model in order to simultaneously examine the effects of Secrecy and Stakeholder on
perceptions of earnings management.
Table 3 presents the results of our regression models. Results indicate that the coefficient on
the Stakeholder variable is positive and significant at p ⬍ 0.01 for the AEM, TYPE, and TEM
analyses, and is significant at p ⬍ 0.05 for the OEM analysis, after controlling for the other
institutional, individual and country factors. Based on stakeholder theory we hypothesized in H2
that participants from stakeholder-oriented countries would be less accepting of earnings management than participants from shareholder-oriented countries. Results from these four analyses provide consistent support for H2 and suggest that participants from stakeholder-oriented countries
were less accepting of all types of earnings management 共TEM兲, as well as AEM and OEM actions,
than participants from shareholder-oriented countries.
To examine H3 we assess the Secrecy variable in our regression models. Results for the
Secrecy factor in the models indicate that the coefficient on the Secrecy variable is in the predicted
direction for all regressions, and is significant at p ⬍ 0.01 for the AEM and TEM analyses, and at
the p ⬍ 0.10 level for the TYPE analysis. However, level of cultural secrecy does not seem to
impact individuals’ perceptions of OEM activities, after controlling for the other institutional,
individual, and country factors. These results provide general support for H3. The TEM results
indicate that the more secretive the culture, the more tolerant individuals are, in general, of
earnings management practices, and the significant AEM results coupled with the non-significant
OEM results suggest that these overall perceptions are driven by differences in perceptions of the
AEM activities. These two effects for AEM and OEM combine to produce a marginal significance
共p ⬍ 0.10兲 for the differences reflected in the TYPE analysis. Our Secrecy results are also consistent with prior research. Specifically, our AEM results are consistent with those of Braun and
Rodriguez 共2008兲, who identified a positive relationship between AEM activities and cultural
secrecy.
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TABLE 3
Regression Results for Perceptions of Earnings Management
Exp.
Sign
Stakeholder

⫹

Secrecy

⫺

Own

⫺

Enforce

⫹

Rights

⫹

GNI

⫹

Age

?

Major

⫺

Intercept
Adjusted R2
n

AEM
.679 ***
共6.609兲
⫺.395 ***
共⫺2.876兲
.222 *
共1.798兲
.419 ***
共3.686兲
.280 ***
共3.930兲
⫺.204 **
共⫺2.008兲
.124 ***
共3.267兲
⫺.084 **
共⫺2.567兲
1.692 ***
共3.654兲
.044
1,260

OEM
.227 **
共2.196兲
⫺.191
共⫺1.382兲
.215 *
共1.731兲
⫺.098
共⫺.854兲
.138 *
共1.931兲
.078
共.763兲
.030
共.795兲
⫺.005
共⫺.163兲
1.355 ***
共3.255兲
.029
1,260

TYPE
(AEM ⴚ OEM)

Total
(TEM)

.489 ***
共4.784兲
⫺.234 *
共⫺1.710兲
.039
共.314兲
.507 ***
共4.479兲
.163 **
共2.300兲
⫺.273 ***
共⫺2.701兲
.099 ***
共2.617兲
⫺.080 **
共⫺2.459兲
.803 *
共1.680兲
.054
1,260

.574***
共5.547兲
⫺.363***
共⫺2.626兲
.258**
共2.073兲
.236**
共2.061兲
.258***
共3.610兲
⫺.100
共⫺.975兲
.099***
共2.598兲
⫺.059*
共⫺1.812兲
1.787***
共4.622兲
.032
1,260

*, **, *** Indicate significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, 共two-tailed兲.
Variables definitions:
Stakeholder ⫽ 1 if from a stakeholder-oriented country, 0 otherwise.
Age ⫽ age of the individual; and
Major ⫽ 0 if an accounting major, 1 otherwise.
All other variables are defined in Table 1 and Table 2.

We also find that our control variables of Enforce and Rights in our regression models are
generally significant and in the expected directions, indicating that the stronger the legal enforcement and shareholder rights in a country, the less accepting the participants are of earnings
management attempts. These results are consistent with those reported in Leuz et al. 共2003兲. In
addition, we find that Age and Major are also generally significant and in our models indicating
that older participants and accounting majors are less accepting of earnings management activities
than younger participants or non-accounting major participants. We also find that Own is generally
positive and significant and GNI is negative and significant in our analyses indicating that countries with greater ownership concentrations and countries with lower GNI are less accepting of
earnings management activities.
In sum, our findings indicate that participants from stakeholder-oriented countries are less
tolerant of earnings management, including both AEM and OEM activities, than participants from
shareholder-oriented countries. We also find that individuals from more secretive countries are
significantly more tolerant of earnings management activities, particularly with respect to AEM
activities. However, the level of cultural secrecy does not appear to be significantly related to
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perceptions of OEM activities for our participants. Overall, our regression results support our main
hypotheses regarding the institutional and cultural factors effecting perceptions of earnings management cross-nationally.9
Additional Analyses
Following prior research, we use a country’s legal system as our proxy for the shareholder/
stakeholder orientation. However, we recognize that this is a rough measure as it does not capture
all of the cross-national institutional differences, which may influence perceptions of financial
reporting and earnings management. For example, Ball et al. 共2003兲 in their study of four East
Asian countries whose legal systems are classified as following a common-law or shareholder
model, concluded that manager and auditor incentives, identified as closely reflecting a code-law
or stakeholder model, were more important in determining earnings quality than was the legal
system classification. Three of the countries considered by Ball et al. 共2003兲 were included in our
study and classified as shareholder countries: Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore. Accordingly,
as a robustness test of our results, we re-estimate our regression models excluding these three
countries from the analyses.
The results for these analyses are consistent with and even stronger than our reported findings
in Table 3. Specifically, the Stakeholder variable is positive and significant at the p ⬍ 0.001 level
for both AEM and OEM regressions and the Secrecy factor being negative and significant at the p
⬍ 0.001 level for AEM and at the p ⬍ 0.05 level for OEM regression. Further, if we reclassify
Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore as stakeholder countries and re-estimate the, we find substantively the same results and significance levels for the Stakeholder and Secrecy variables in the
TEM and both the AEM and OEM regressions as originally reported in Table 3. The consistency of
these re-estimated results suggest that even though these East Asian countries may exhibit certain
stakeholder traits, our overall results are generally robust to their shareholder/stakeholder identification or to their exclusion.
In addition, although we test for differences between participants in their native country and
those “studying abroad” and find no significant univariate differences, in order to help assure that
our results are not confounded by participants misclassified as to country of origin, we eliminate
participants completing the instrument in Australia. We do this test because Australian universities
have a fairly high percentage of visiting non-national students studying on student visas. Most of
the other countries included in our study had no or very few visiting non-national students. Results
of our re-estimated models using all non-Australian participants are substantively the same as
those presented in Table 3. We found the same significance levels for the Stakeholder and Secrecy
factors for the AEM, TEM, and TYPE regressions, and the OEM regression revealed even stronger
results with the Stakeholder factor significant at the p ⬍ 0.01 level and the Secrecy factor significant at the p ⬍ 0.05 level. Thus, our results do not appear to be confounded by the possible
misclassification of visiting non-national students.
Another area of possible bias arising from the cross-national survey methodology employed
in our study is the risk of a culture-related response bias. Prior research has identified bias in the
way in which participants from different cultures respond to Likert-type rating scales 共Stening and
Everett 1984; Culpepper and Zimmerman 2006兲. For example, Stening and Everett 共1984兲 in their
9

Our examination of 13 countries effectively precludes a meaningful analysis of the interaction of our two main independent variables due to the difficulty with interpretation of the statistical results with respect to a continuous independent variable, even after centering the continuous predictors 共Kachigan 1986兲, and to the very few countries 共often only
one兲 that would be relegated to each of the possible quadrants, regardless of how we might dichotomize our Secrecy
score into high and low groups. Accordingly, we do not perform tests of the interaction of our two main independent
variables.
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cross-cultural study of response styles found respondents from Indonesia and Malaysia demonstrated a very high use of extreme responses. In order to assess whether country differences to
“extremes” response bias to our instrument 共i.e., either a general tendency to indicate a 1 or a 5
when responding; or general tendency to avoid indicating a 1 or a 5 when responding兲 may be
affecting our results, we combine 1 and 2 responses and 4 and 5 responses and re-estimate our
regression models using this modified three-point scale 共1/3/5兲, which may be interpreted as
ethical/uncertain/unethical. Results of these models using the modified three-point scale are substantively the same as those presented in Table 3 using the five-point scale. The Stakeholder factor
is significant at the p ⬍ 0.01 level in the AEM, TEM, and TYPE regressions and at p ⬍ 0.05 level
in the OEM regression. The Secrecy factor is significant at the p ⬍ 0.01 level in the AEM and TEM
regressions and at the p ⬍ 0.05 level in the TYPE regression. Similar to the results of the five-point
scale analysis the Secrecy factor is not significant in the OEM regression. These findings imply
that culture-related response bias is not substantively affecting our regression results or our resultant conclusions.
Further, to provide additional testing of our composite Secrecy score, we separately analyze
the three cultural components from Hofstede 共2001兲 used to calculate the score—individualism
共IND兲, power distance 共POW兲, and uncertainty avoidance 共UA兲. If we replace our Secrecy score in
model 1 with the three component variables 共IND, POW, and UA兲 and re-estimate the AEM, OEM,
and TEM regressions we find that the Stakeholder factor and each of the three individual cultural
variables is significant 共p ⬍ 0.01兲 and in the expected direction in each of the regressions. These
results are consistent and even stronger than the model 1 regression results using the composite
Secrecy score, in that we found no significance 共p ⬍ 0.10兲 for the Secrecy score in the OEM
regression, yet we find that the individual components are significant at p ⬍ 0.01 in our expanded
model. However, given that our objective in this study was to assess the level of secrecy in a
country on perceptions of earnings management, we believe that the use of the composite Secrecy
score provides a more parsimonious measure for our analyses, and our conclusions generally
would not have changed with the inclusion of three separate cultural variables.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this study we examine the association between perceptions of earnings management and
institutional and cultural factors across 13 countries. We find that earnings management practices,
including both accounting and operating earnings management practices, are perceived as less
acceptable by individuals from stakeholder-oriented corporate governance countries in comparison
to shareholder-oriented countries. These findings are consistent with the argument that the broader
perspective of stakeholder-oriented countries would lead individuals to perceive any earnings
management attempt as effecting multiple parties, and not just the shareholders, causing them to
be less accepting of any earnings management attempts 共Freeman et al. 2007; van der Laan Smith
et al. 2005兲. In addition, we find that earnings management practices are perceived as more
acceptable by individuals from countries with more secretive cultures, with accounting earnings
management activities being perceived as significantly more acceptable in cultures with greater
secrecy. Our study extends the literature by providing the first direct assessment of the relation
between a country’s level of cultural secrecy and individual perceptions of the acceptability of
earnings management practices.
However, our perceptual findings are somewhat in contrast to prior research that has argued
that stakeholder-oriented countries exhibit greater amounts of reported accounting earnings management in their financial reports 共e.g., Ball et al. 2000兲. The disparity in findings regarding
perceptions of earnings management and those of prior stakeholder/shareholder researchers using
surrogates for reported earnings management need to be further explored in the literature. Given
that the examined surrogates for earnings management are actually representative of attempts to
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manage reported earnings 共e.g., the delayed reporting of financial losses in Ball et al. 2000兲, what
other factors 共i.e., institutional, financial, governmental, common financial practices, etc.兲 may
account for the difference in perceptions versus reporting actions across the stakeholder/
shareholder dichotomy found in these prior studies? Based on our findings, these additional factors
or relationships may help identify countries or situations in which earnings management may be
more or less likely to be found in a company’s financial statements and disclosures 共Zeff 2007兲.
Future research should also further examine the relation between perceptions of earnings
management and actual financial reporting actions in disparate settings. In essence, do managers
act similarly to their perceptions, and in what settings? Are there other personal, social, or institutional factors that help in identifying or explaining the difference between individuals’ perceptions of earnings management and eventual reporting actions? Further, are there any differences
with respect to internal reporting issues 共i.e., budgets, operating, and internal reports兲 and external
reporting situations 共i.e., releasing the firm’s financial information to the public兲 with respect to
perceptions of earnings management? To date, research has only begun to address external reporting issues and has yet to address the subject of differences in internal reporting practices across
countries, and whether these differences vary significantly due to institutional or cultural factors.
Additionally, future research should examine the relationship between the cultural dimension
of secrecy and other financial reporting measures such as levels or the direction of discretionary
accounting accruals, using special income statement items, or just meeting or beating analysts’
earnings expectations in an effort to extend the extant literature 共i.e., Ball et al. 2000兲. Examining
these and other measures of financial reporting quality in the context of cultural factors, such as
secrecy, would extend our knowledge of differences in financial reporting around the globe.
There are limitations related to the nature of our research and our results must be interpreted
with these limitations in mind. First, our study used the dominant legal system in the country as a
proxy for the country’s stakeholder/shareholder orientation. While this proxy provided a robust
measure for our analysis, we recognize that it does not include all of the variables that may
influence perceptions of financial reporting and earnings management. Additionally, a concern
with the use of perceptual data is that there are unmeasured, extraneous variables that may affect
the responses. While we identified and measured variables based on prior research and theory, the
risk remains that there are unidentified variables that may affect our results.
Notwithstanding these possible limitations, our perceptual findings provide evidence that
differences in perceptions of earnings management across countries are significantly associated
with the country’s stakeholder/shareholder orientation and the level of cultural secrecy. Our findings also suggest the need for further research regarding the link between the perceptions of
earnings management and the level and measurement of earnings management activities that may
exist across countries as well as the institutional and market factors that may account for these
disparities 共Ball et al. 2000; Othman and Zeghal 2006; Jeanjean and Stolowy 2008兲. Overall, our
findings contribute to the ongoing cross-country debate regarding the complex relationship between institutions, culture, and financial reporting 共Hope 2003; Zeff 2007兲.
APPENDIX
INSTRUCTIONS
The following questions reflect everyday ethical choices. Please evaluate the practices as they
apply to a major division 共annual revenues of, say, $100 million兲 of a billion-dollar public company. Use the following scale to indicate how you judge their acceptability.
1.
2.

Ethical practice.
Questionable practice. I would not say anything to the manager, but it makes me uncomfortable.
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3.
4.
5.

Minor infraction. The manager should be warned not to do it again.
Serious infraction. The manager should be severely reprimanded.
Totally unethical. The manager should be fired.
QUESTIONS

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

The division’s headquarters building was scheduled to be painted in 1999. But since
profit performance was way ahead of budget in 1998, the division general manager 共GM兲
decided to have the work done in 1998. Amount: $150,000.
The GM ordered his employees to defer all discretionary expenditures 共e.g., travel, advertising, hiring, maintenance兲 into the next accounting period, so his division could
make its budgeted profit targets. Expected amount of deferrals: $150,000.
a. The expenses were postponed from February and March until April in order to make
the first quarter target.
b. The expenses were postponed from November and December until January in order to
make the annual target.
On December 15, a clerk ordered $3,000 of office supplies, and the supplies were delivered on December 29. This order was a mistake because the GM had ordered that no
discretionary expenses be incurred for the remainder of the fiscal year, and the supplies
were not urgently needed. The company’s accounting policy manual states that office
supplies are to be recorded as an expense when delivered. The GM learned what had
happened, and to correct the mistake, he asked the accounting department not to record
the invoice until February.
In September, the GM realized the division would need strong performance in the fourth
quarter to reach its budget targets.
a. He decided to implement a sales program offering liberal payment terms to pull some
sales that would normally occur next year into the current year; customers accepting
delivery in the fourth quarter would not have to pay the invoice for 120 days.
b. He ordered manufacturing to work overtime in December so that everything possible
could be shipped by the end of the year.
c. He sold some excess assets and realized profit of $40,000.
At the beginning of December 1998, the GM realized the division would exceed its
budgeted profit targets for the year.
a. He ordered his controller to prepay some expenses 共e.g., hotel rooms, exhibit expense兲
for a major trade show to be held in March 1998 and to book them as 1997 expenses.
Amount: $60,000.
b. He ordered his controller to develop the rationale for increasing the reserve for inventory obsolescence. By taking a pessimistic view of future market prospects, the controller was able to identify $700,000 worth of finished goods that conservative accounting would say should be fully reserved 共i.e., written off兲, even though the GM
was fairly confident the inventory would still be sold at a later date at close to full
price.
The next year, the division sold 70 percent of the written-off inventory, and a customer
had indicated some interest in buying the rest of that inventory the following year. The
GM ordered his controller to prepare the rationale for reducing the reserve for obsolescence by $210,000 共i.e., writing up the previously written-off goods to full cost兲. The
GM’s motivation for recapturing the profit was as follows:
a. To be able to continue working on some important product development projects that
might have been delayed due to budget constraints.
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b. To make budgeted profit targets.
In November 1998, the division was straining to meet budget. The GM called the engagement partner of a consulting firm that was doing some work for the division and
asked that the firm not send an invoice until next year. The partner agreed. Estimated
work done but not invoiced:
a. $30,000
b. $500,000
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